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Futility of Suppression
Abstract
The belief that we can control our thoughts is not inevitably adaptive, particularly when it fuels 
mental control activities that have ironic unintended consequences.  The conviction that the mind 
can and should be controlled can prompt people to suppress unwanted thoughts, and so can set 
the stage for the intrusive return of those very thoughts.  An important question is whether or not 
these beliefs about the control of thoughts can be reduced experimentally.  One possibility is that 
behavioral experiments aimed at revealing the ironic return of suppressed thoughts might create 
a lesson that could reduce unrealistic beliefs about the control of thoughts.  In two studies, we 
assessed the influence of the thought suppression demonstration on beliefs about the control of 
thoughts among low and high obsessive individuals in the non-clinical population, and among 
individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  Results suggest that high obsessive 
individuals in the non-clinical population are able to learn the futility of suppression through 
the thought suppression demonstration and to alter their faulty beliefs about the control of 
thoughts; however, for individuals with OCD, the demonstration may be insufficient for altering 
underlying beliefs.
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Futility of Suppression
The happiness of your life depends upon the quality of your thoughts, therefore guard 
accordingly; and take care that you entertain no notions unsuitable to virtue, and 
reasonable nature. 
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121 AD - 180 AD)
The motivation to rid one’s mind of unwanted thoughts is an intuitive one.  After all, 
unpleasant thoughts are accompanied by unpleasant emotions.  It turns out, however, in two 
decades since the first empirical investigation of the phenomenon (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & 
White, 1987), that the stoic prescription above does not work.  Quite to the contrary, the salience 
attributed to unwanted thoughts and the drive to eliminate them from consciousness might create 
the precise formula for turning the ordinary experience of unwanted thoughts into the painful 
experience of obsessions.
There exists a large body of evidence to suggest that the management of intrusive 
thoughts is a tricky enterprise.  According to Wegner’s (1994) ironic process theory, suppression 
is at best unsustainable and at worst counterproductive, and this “rebound” of unwanted thoughts 
occurs both in normal experience as well in many forms of psychopathology (see reviews by 
Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001; Clark, 2005; Najmi & Wegner, 2008; Rassin, 2005; 
Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000), such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Shipherd & Beck, 
1999), acute stress disorder (Guthrie & Bryant, 2000; Harvey & Bryant, 1998) and depression 
(Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998; Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2001; Wenzlaff, 
Meir, & Salas, 2002; Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is defined by the persistence of unwanted thoughts 
and active resistance of these thoughts, and so the fact that thought suppression may have a role 
to play in the maintenance of OCD is not surprising, although the precise nature of this role is 
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Futility of Suppression
not straightforward.  According to the cognitive-behavioral perspective on OCD (Salkovskis, 
1985; Rachman, 1997), the unwanted, intrusive thoughts that characterize OCD may persist 
because of two processes in addition to suppression: pre-existing beliefs about intrusive thoughts 
and faulty interpretations of intrusions (Clark, 2001).  In other words, dysfunctional appraisals 
of the thoughts—for instance, that unwanted thoughts should be controlled and that their 
occurrence is a sign of impending danger or of immorality of the person having the thought—
and unsuccessful attempts to neutralize and suppress these thoughts may cause normal unwanted 
thoughts to escalate into clinical obsessions.   Thus, according to this model, thought suppression 
alone is not the primary factor implicated in the pathogenesis of obsessions, but rather it is 
suppression motivated by the need to control unwanted thoughts in order to prevent harm.  
With a few exceptions (Kelly & Kahn, 1994; Purdon & Clark, 2001), the paradoxical 
effects of suppressing obsessional thoughts in non-clinical samples have been observed fairly 
consistently (McNally and Ricciardi, 1996; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Salkovskis & 
Reynolds, 1994; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994).  For instance, in a series of studies, Salkovskis 
and colleagues observed a suppression-related increase in intrusive thoughts both in the lab and 
over a four-day naturalistic follow-up.  Studies examining the suppression of neutral targets 
with OCD patients have found evidence for the counterproductive effects of suppression (e.g., 
Tolin, Abramowitz, Przeworski, and Foa, 2002a).  However, to date, the three studies with OCD 
patients that have explored the effects of suppressing obsessional thoughts revealed no evidence 
for an  increase in thought frequency (Janeck & Calamari, 1999; Najmi, Riemann, & Wegner, in 
press; Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2005).  
This raises the question: If OCD patients are no worse than healthy individuals at 
suppressing their unwanted thoughts, why do they report heightened inadequacy in controlling 
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these thoughts?  Purdon and Clark (2000) have argued that certain individuals hold preexisting 
metacognitive beliefs (Flavell,1979) about the control of thoughts, namely, that unwanted 
thoughts can and should be controlled and that intrusive thoughts are the product of an unhealthy 
mind.  These include beliefs about the need to control unwanted thoughts in order to prevent 
negative consequences (e.g., “If I don’t control my unwanted thoughts, something bad is bound 
to happen.”) and beliefs about the controllability of unwanted thoughts (e.g., “If I exercise 
enough will-power, I should be able to gain complete control over my mind.”) (OCCWG, 1997).  
These beliefs may sensitize OCD patients to their inability to suppress their thoughts perfectly, 
and they may judge their ability against their unrealistic beliefs about the controllability of 
thoughts.  For example, Tolin, Abramowitz, Hamlin, Foa, and Synodi (2002a) observed that 
OCD patients are more likely than anxious and non-anxious controls to attribute a failure of 
thought suppression to internal, negative reasons (e.g., “I am mentally weak”).  
These faulty, preexisting beliefs about the control of thoughts—that unwanted 
thoughts can and should be controlled—are the focus of the present research.  More specifically, 
we examined the question of whether or not these faulty beliefs may be reduced by means of a 
behavioral experiment, the original thought suppression demonstration with a neutral 
suppression target (Wegner et al.,1997).  The rationale is that if we were to instruct OCD 
patients to suppress an obsessional thought, subsequent failures of suppression would enhance 
their negative appraisal of the thought, which would lead to escalating suppression effort.  On 
the other hand, if we instruct OCD patients to suppress a neutral thought, we would not expect 
subsequent failures of suppression to lead to negative appraisal of the thought itself since the 
thought is neutral, and hence we might expect that the exercise gives the OCD patient the 
opportunity to learn that suppression is futile.  This idea is not new—since the original white 
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bear experiment (Wegner et al., 1997), the thought suppression demonstration has been used as a 
behavioral experiment in the treatment of OCD (e.g., Wilhelm & Steketee, 2006).  Patients are 
invited to suppress thoughts of a neutral target, e.g., a white bear or some equivalent, and 
subsequent occurrences of white bear images are then used as the basis for a psychoeducational 
discussion about how thoughts cannot and hence should not be suppressed (Salkovskis & 
Campbell, 1994; Wilhelm, as cited in Baer, 2002).  In the present research, we are interested in 
exploring whether learning the futility of suppression occurs with the suppression demonstration 
alone or if the psychoeducational discussion is necessary to effect a change in thoughts and 
underlying beliefs.
The choice of a neutral target of suppression rather than a personally relevant negative 
thought has been well articulated by Tolin, Abramowitz, Przeworski, and Foa (2002b).  They 
note that instructing individuals with OCD to suppress an obsessional thought is essentially 
a ‘non-intervention’ since individuals in the non-suppression control group are being asked to 
act against what they would naturally do.  Based on the results of their study, Tolin et al. (2002b) 
concluded that individuals with OCD appear to have a general deficit in their ability to control 
thoughts, and this will be manifested in their ability to control neutral thoughts.  This design 
also overcomes the problem of spontaneous suppression as presumably people are not naturally 
motivated to suppress emotionally neutral thoughts.  
The question we are examining in the current research is: Can individuals learn from the 
behavioral experiment—suppression of a neutral target—to alter their faulty beliefs about the 
control of thoughts?  Since we know from previous research (Purdon & Clark, 1993; Rachman 
& de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984) that obsessions lie on a continuum with normal 
thoughts, we first examined this question using a non-clinical sample (Study 1) and then with 
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a sample of OCD patients (Study 2).  We hypothesized that participants in the suppression 
condition, but not in the control condition, would report learning that suppression is futile and 
will report a reduction in obsessive beliefs about the control of thoughts.
Study 1
Method
Overview
Prior to the laboratory session, participants were sent a questionnaire to assess severity of 
obsessive symptoms via email, and were asked to bring the completed questionnaire to the 
session.  On arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that the experiment was concerned 
with “thoughts about thoughts” and that they would be asked to do a thought task which involves 
speaking out loud into an audio recorder.  Informed consent was obtained from the participants. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental condition or the control 
condition.  Next, in the experimental condition (i.e., suppression condition) only, participants 
were asked to report their stream of consciousness while trying to not think of a penguin, and to 
indicate any intrusions of the thought of a penguin by pressing a hand-held counter.  In the 
control condition, participants were asked simply to report their stream of consciousness.  Each 
participant was asked to perform the thought task three times. Finally, participants were 
administered additional questionnaires and were debriefed about the study.
Participants
Participants (37 women, 25 men) were undergraduates in psychology courses who 
received course credit for participation and members of the community who responded to 
advertisements and were paid $10 for their participation.  Mean age of the participants was 20.9 
years (SD = 6.5). 
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Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to the suppression or control condition.  In the 
control condition, participants were given the following instructions to report on their stream of 
consciousness for five minutes:
“I would like you simply to say everything that comes to your mind while you are doing 
the thinking task.  Your report might include, but is not limited to, your images, ideas, 
memories, feelings, plans, sensations, observations, daydreams, objects which catch 
your attention, or efforts to solve a problem.  There are no restrictions, qualifications, 
conventions, or expectations.  There are some things you may not want to say, and that 
is fine.  Just mention whatever you can.  Simply report on whatever is going on in your 
mind, whatever you are conscious or aware of.”
In the suppression condition, participants were first given the following instructions:
“I would like you to think about a penguin.  Can you describe a penguin to me? 
[Participant describes penguin].  Good.  We just have to make sure everyone knows what 
a penguin is.  Then, I will ask you to suppress the thought of a penguin while you report 
your stream of consciousness – whatever is in your mind at the moment, you can report 
verbally into this audio recorder. Your job, then, is to try not to think about a penguin.”
Participants were then given the same stream of consciousness instructions as in the control 
condition.  Furthermore, they were instructed to press a hand-held counter any time they had a 
thought about a penguin.  Each participant repeated the five-minute thought task three times.
Self-report measures
Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989) is a 10-item 
scale for rating obsessions and compulsions separately on five items (0-4) for a total score that 
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varies from 0-40.  The Y-BOCS is a reliable and valid measure and is available in both clinician-
rated and self-rated versions (Taylor, 1995).  The self-report version was used in this study.  
Participants completed the obsessions questions on the Y-BOCS questionnaire prior to the 
laboratory session and the full Y-BOCS (obsessions and compulsions questions) at the end of the 
laboratory session.
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-87) consists of 87 items reflecting beliefs 
considered characteristic of obsessive thinking (OCCWG, 1997; 2001).  Items on the 
questionnaire represent six subscales that reflect the six key belief domains of OCD.  The 
subscales are beliefs about the Control of Thoughts (14 items) and five others which assess 
beliefs about the importance of thoughts, responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty, 
overestimation of threat, and perfectionism.  Item responses are made on a 7-point rating scale 
that ranges from (1) “disagree very much” to (4) “neutral” to (7) “agree very much.”  Subscales 
scores were calculated by summing across their respective items to compute a mean score.  The 
OBQ-87 has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure (OCCWG, 2003).  Participants 
completed the OBQ-87 at the end of the laboratory session.
Follow-up Survey is a self-report questionnaire designed for this study in which 
participants were asked to report on their response to the thought exercises in the experiment.  
The questionnaire included the following manipulation check question, “How often, during the 
exercise, did you try not to think this thought?” (on a 1-9 scale), and a question regarding 
learning, “Did you learn anything from these thought exercises?” (free-form text).  Participants 
completed the Follow-up Survey at the end of the laboratory session.
Data Analysis Plan
Those scoring at or above a score of 6 on the Obsessions subscale of the Y-BOCS 
9
 
Futility of Suppression
questionnaire completed prior to the laboratory session and those scoring at or below 5 were 
classified as high and low obsessive participants, respectively.  The cutoff was chosen based on a 
median split for the sample. A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with obsession group (low, high) 
and instruction (suppression, control) as between-subjects factors.  The dependent measures 
were scores on the Control of Thoughts subscale of the OBQ-87 and the follow-up survey. 
Results
A cutoff of 6 on the Obsessions subscale of the Y-BOCS questionnaire resulted in 12 low 
and 18 high obsessive participants in the control condition, and 17 low and 15 high obsessive 
participants in the suppression condition.
Obsession Severity at Baseline
Independent samples t-tests on baseline Y-BOCS Obsessions scores revealed that there 
was no difference in symptom severity between low obsessive participants in the suppression 
group (M = 3.29) and control group (M = 3.58), t(27) = .56, p > .57, at baseline.  Similarly, there 
was no difference in symptom severity between high obsessive participants in the suppression 
group (M = 7.67) and control group (M = 8.56), t(31) = 1.55, p > .13, at baseline. 
Learning the Futility of Suppression
The free-form response to the question on the follow-up survey “Did you learn anything 
from these thought exercise” was coded dichotomously as a response to the question “Do you 
believe that trying not to think about an unwanted thought is a good strategy.” We coded a “no” 
if the participant reported learning from the suppression exercise that suppression is a 
counterproductive strategy for controlling unwanted thoughts.  Since the focus of this study is 
whether participants learn the futility of suppression, we coded all other responses as “other” 
(including participants’ reports of learning that suppression is a good strategy or if they did not 
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report learning anything related to the effectiveness of suppression). Coding was completed by a 
research assistant who was blind to condition and was unaware of the study hypotheses. Scores 
were submitted to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with obsession group (low, high) and instruction 
(suppression, control) as between-subjects factors.  The obsession group × instruction 
interaction was not significant, F(1, 58) = .75, p = .39, η2 = .01.  However, a main effect of 
instruction was found such that participants in the suppression condition (M = 1.15) were less 
likely than those in the control condition (M = 1.43) to endorse suppression as an effective 
strategy for dealing with unwanted thoughts, F(1, 58) = 6.04, p < .02, η2 = .09 (Figure 1).  Thus, 
low and high obsessive participants who completed the suppression exercise reported learning 
the futility of suppression.
Beliefs about the Control of Thoughts
Scores for the OBQ Control of Thoughts subscale were submitted to a 2 × 2 ANOVA 
with obsession group (low, high) and instruction (suppression, control) as between-subjects 
factors.  A significant obsession group × instruction interaction was observed F(1, 58) = 5.13, p 
< .03, η2 = .08 and its form was as predicted.  Analysis of simple effects showed that high 
obsessive participants had significantly lower Control of Thoughts scores after suppression (M = 
2.87) than after the control condition (M = 3.78), F(1, 59) = 7.97, p < .01, whereas among low 
obsessive participants there was no difference in Control of Thoughts scores between the 
suppression (M = 2.62) and control (M = 2.46) conditions, F(1, 59) = .00, p = .99 (Figure 2).  
Moreover, there was a significant difference in Control of Thoughts scores during the control 
condition between the low (M = 2.46) and high (M = 3.78) obsessive groups, F(1, 59) = 16.7, p 
< .001, but not during the suppression condition between the low (M = 2.62) and high (M = 2.87) 
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obsessive groups, F(1, 59) = .7, p = .41. 
Ruling Out Alternative Interpretations
To explore effects of the mental control instruction, we examined occurrences of the 
suppression target word (“penguin”) in the stream of consciousness reports of the participants in 
the suppression condition.  “Penguin” intrusions were added across the three consecutive five-
minute suppression periods. The difference between the number of intrusions of the suppression 
target experienced by low obsessive participants (M = 21) and high obsessive participants (M = 
19) was not statistically significant, F(1, 30) = .04, p > .83.  A similar pattern was observed for 
intrusions recorded by the participants on the counter.  Post-task responses to the item “How 
often, during the exercise, did you try not to think this thought?” were also not significantly 
different between the low (M = 12) and high (M = 11) obsessive participants, F(1, 30) = .37, p 
> .55.  Thus, effects of the experimental manipulation are unlikely to be due to a difference in 
the number of intrusions of the target word or in suppression effort between the low and high 
obsessive groups.  Most important to note is that, with the exception of two participants in the 
low obsessive group, no one in the suppression condition across the low and high obsessive 
groups reported perfect suppression.  In fact, mean “penguin” intrusions for this group was 
20.13, confirming the inefficiency of suppression. As was expected in the control condition, 
since there was no mention of “penguin” in the instructions, no participant in this condition 
reported a “penguin” intrusion.
Scores for the Y-BOCS Obsessions subscale were submitted to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with 
obsession group (low, high) and instruction (suppression, control) as the between-subjects 
factors.  The obsession group × instruction interaction was not significant F(1, 58) = 2.47, p 
= .12, η2 = .04.   Next, scores for the Y-BOCS Compulsions subscale were submitted to a 2 × 2 
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ANOVA with obsession group (low, high) and instruction (suppression, control) as the between-
subjects factors.  Again, the obsession group × instruction interaction was not significant F(1, 
58) = .05, p = .82, η2 = .001.  Thus, effects of the experimental manipulation are unlikely to be 
due to differences in obsessive-compulsive symptoms. 
Summary
Taken together, results show that both low and high obsessive participants report learning 
the futility of suppression after the suppression exercise.  Furthermore, after the suppression 
exercise, obsessive beliefs about the control of thoughts in the high obsessive group were as low 
as those of the low obsessive group. This was not the case for the control condition, after which 
obsessive beliefs about the control of thoughts were significantly higher in the high obsessive 
group as compared to the low obsessive group.
Study 2
Method
Overview
Participants consisted of individuals with a primary diagnosis of OCD as assessed by a 
clinical interview, the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID, First, Spitzer, Gibbon, 
& Williams, 1995) and a cutoff score of obsessive-compulsive symptom severity.  The 
procedure for Study 2 was similar to that of Study 1 with one exception: In addition to 
completing the self-report measures following the task, participants also completed these 
measures prior to the experimental task.  At the end of the session, participants were given a 
packet of questionnaires with instructions to complete and return within three days.
Participants
Twenty-nine OCD patients (17 women, 12 men) participated in the study.  Clinical 
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participants were recruited from the OCD Clinic at Massachusetts General Hospital and from the 
community via advertisements.  Requirements for inclusion in the clinical group were a primary 
diagnosis of OCD, a Y-BOCS total score greater than or equal to16, and a Y-BOCS Obsessions 
score greater than or equal to 8.  Participants were excluded from the study if they had a history 
of psychotic disorders, bipolar disorder, or PTSD,  or evidence of substance abuse within the 
past month.  Additionally, participants were excluded from the study if they endorsed prior 
exposure to the thought suppression demonstration or suppression-related psychoeducation 
during therapy.  One participant was excluded from analysis because she did not return the post-
task questionnaires.  The mean Y-BOCS score for the sample was 21.68 (SD = 5.24), the mean 
for the Obsessions subscale was 11.07 (SD = 2.69), and for the Compulsions subscale was 10.61 
(SD = 3.48).  Thus, our sample was in the moderate range of symptom severity.  Of the clinical 
sample, four (14%) had a comorbid diagnosis of major depressive disorder, three (11%) had a 
comorbid diagnosis of social anxiety disorder, three (11%) had comorbid generalized anxiety 
disorder, and six (21%) had comorbid specific phobia.  Eleven participants (39%) were on 
anxiolytic medication.  Participants received monetary inducement for participation.  Four 
participants did not enter their ages; the mean age for the rest of the sample was 37.8 years (SD = 
13.8). 
Procedure 
During a phone screen, potential participants completed the Y-BOCS.  Inclusion criteria 
for the clinical group were a Y-BOCS Obsessions score of 8 or higher, and a Y-BOCS total 
score of 16 or higher.  If eligible, participants were invited to the laboratory session. The study 
procedures were explained to the participants and informed consent was obtained before 
proceeding. During the session, participants were first asked questions about their psychiatric 
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history and screened for current and past Axis I disorders using the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV.  Participants who did not fully meet eligibility criteria were paid for their time and 
excluded from further participation.  Eligible participants completed a set of questionnaires and 
were randomly assigned to the suppression (n = 14) or control condition (n = 14).  The 
instructions for the conditions were the same as those described above for Study 1.  After the 
task, participants were given a packet of the same questionnaires that they completed prior to the 
experimental task and were asked to complete the questionnaires and to return them to us within 
three days.
Self-report measures
The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale, the Follow-up Survey, and the Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-87) are described above.
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 
1995).  The SCID was used to assess the diagnostic status for all OCD patients.  It is a widely 
used instrument with acceptable psychometric properties (First et al., 1995).  All SCIDs were 
administered by authors HR and JF.
Data Analysis Plan
A 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with instruction (suppression, 
control) as the between-subjects factor.  The dependent measures were scores on the follow-up 
survey and pre/post-task scores on the Control of Thoughts subscale of the OBQ-87.
Results
Baseline Assessment
Independent samples t-tests on baseline Y-BOCS and OBQ-87 scores revealed no 
differences between the suppression and control groups at baseline (see Table 1). 
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Learning the Futility of Suppression
As in Study 1, the free-form response to the question on the follow-up survey “Did you 
learn anything from these thought exercise” was coded dichotomously as a response to the 
question “Do you believe that trying not to think about an unwanted thought is a good strategy.”   
As in Study 1, we coded a “no” if the participant reported learning from the suppression 
exercise that suppression is a counterproductive strategy for controlling unwanted thoughts.  An 
example of a “no” response from our sample was “I learned from the exercise that thoughts 
seem to become ‘OCD’ when we avoid them and give them power in a sense.”  An independent 
samples t-test with instruction (suppression, control) as the independent variable revealed that 
participants in the suppression group were less likely to endorse suppression as an effective 
strategy for dealing with unwanted thoughts than were participants in the control group, t(26) 
= 3.12, p < .004.  Most important to note is that no one in the suppression condition reported 
perfect suppression.  In fact, mean “penguin” intrusions for this group was 23.69, confirming the 
ineffectiveness of suppression. 
Beliefs about the Control of Thoughts
Scores for the OBQ Control of Thoughts subscale were submitted to a 2 × 2 repeated-
measures ANOVA with instruction (suppression, control) as the between-subjects factor and 
time (pre-task, post-task) as the within-subjects variable.  The instruction × time interaction was 
not significant, F(1, 26) = .32, p = .58, η2 = .01, and neither was the main effect of instruction, 
F(1, 26) = 2.33, p = .14, η2 = .08.
Summary
Results from this study show that although participants learned the futility of suppression 
after the suppression exercise, they did not experience a reduction in obsessive beliefs about the 
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control of thoughts.
Discussion
In Study 1, the non-clinical, high obsessive group learned the futility of suppression after 
the suppression exercise and experienced a reduction in obsessive beliefs about the control of 
thoughts.  Additional analyses confirmed that these results were not due to a difference in 
number of target intrusions, that is, the low obsessive group was no better or worse than the high 
obsessive group in its ability to suppress thoughts.  Additional analyses also confirmed that these 
results were not due to a difference in suppression effort between low and high obsessive 
participants in the suppression group.  In Study 2, on the other hand, although individuals with 
OCD also learned the futility of suppression after the suppression exercise, contrary to our 
prediction, they did not experience a reduction in obsessive beliefs about the control of thoughts.
Taken together, results of the two studies suggest that learning the futility of suppression 
may be necessary and sufficient for altering faulty beliefs about the control of thoughts in high 
obsessive individuals in the non-clinical population, but for individuals with OCD, this learning 
may be insufficient for altering underlying beliefs.  We suspect that underlying beliefs about the 
control of thoughts may be more ingrained in individuals with OCD and hence altering them 
may take multiple iterations of the suppression demonstration.  In an open trial assessing the 
effectiveness of cognitive therapy for OCD, Wilhelm et al. (2005) have shown that underlying 
obsessional beliefs, including beliefs about the control of thoughts, can indeed be altered in 
patients with OCD.  In the trial, however, therapists used Socratic questioning, cognitive 
restructuring, and mindfulness skills, in addition to the suppression demonstration.  Moreover, 
multiple belief domains were targeted simultaneously, for example, in addition to beliefs about 
the control of thoughts, the treatment targeted beliefs about overinflated sense of responsibility 
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and over-importance of thoughts. It may be argued that beliefs about the need to control 
unwanted thoughts become more amenable to change if the patient is simultaneously learning to 
reduce the importance of unwanted thoughts or beliefs about his/her own responsibility to 
prevent the consequences of the thought. Finally, the trial was run over a period of 14 weeks.  
Thus, it may well be possible to modify underlying beliefs in OCD, but only over a longer period 
of time and with multiple techniques aimed at challenging underlying beliefs.
One possibility is that, in Study 2, since we did not conduct the post-manipulation 
assessment immediately after the manipulation, and instead allowed participants to turn it in up to 
three days after the session, we might have diminished the likelihood of finding effects of the 
manipulation. Another limitation of our study relates to the difference in learning during a 
contrived lab task versus applying it to a personally salient obsession.  For example, individuals 
with OCD have greater practice suppressing their obsessions on a regular basis and this could be 
one reason why, in Study 2, demonstration with a contrived task did not produce significant 
learning. Another potential limitation of our design is the lack of pre-manipulation assessment of 
the key dependent variable (beliefs about the control of thoughts) in Study 1. We have assumed 
that the combination of fairly large sample size (N = 62) and random assignment to conditions in 
Study 1 has resulted in comparable pre-manipulation beliefs about the control of thoughts in the 
suppression and control groups. Additionally, we did test for comparability of pre-manipulation 
obsessional symptoms and found no difference in symptom severity between low obsessive 
participants in the suppression and control groups, or between high obsessive participants in the 
suppression and control groups. Nevertheless, the fact that we did not measure pre-manipulation 
beliefs about the control of thoughts could be a potential limitation of Study 1.  In Study 2, 
however, since our sample size was smaller (N = 28), we did complete a pre-manipulation 
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assessment of the key dependent variable to avoid the potential problem of unequal groups at 
baseline. Finally, 39% of the sample for Study 2 was on anxiolytic mediation. Although this 
constituted a similar number of participants in the suppression (n = 5) and the control conditions (n 
= 6), it is possible that medication affected the two groups differentially. Given the small sample 
size, we were unable to conduct additional analyses to examine the effects of medication on our 
results.  
In our study, we have shown that patients with OCD are able to learn the futility of 
suppressing a neutral target; however, it may be the case that they are unable to make the 
connection between suppressing a neutral thought and a personally relevant obsession and hence 
do not show reductions in underlying beliefs.  For OCD patients, this connection may need to be 
stated explicitly in order to affect their obsessive beliefs.  In terms of treatment, this might be 
accomplished by following up the suppression demonstration with a psychoeducational 
discussion about the futility of suppression of all types of thoughts, including neutral ones, like 
thoughts of penguins, and distressing ones, such as their obsessions (see Wilhelm & Steketee, 
2006).  Our hope is that through repeating a combination of the suppression demonstration and a 
psychoeducational discussion about the futility of suppression, over time patients will come to 
learn that their thoughts are not the problem, but rather it is their maladaptive beliefs about the 
need to control thoughts and their unrealistic expectations regarding the controllability of 
thoughts. 
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Table 1
Baseline measures
    Suppression  Control   
  M SD M SD   
Y-BOCS Obsessions 10.64 1.98 11.50 3.28 t(26) = .84, p > .41
Y-BOCS Compulsions 10.14 3.78 11.07 3.22 t(26) = .70, p > .49
OBQ Control of Thoughts 3.49 1.30 4.25 1.03 t(26) = 1.71, p > .10
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Figure 1. Follow-up Survey response (“Do you believe that trying not to think about an 
unwanted thought is a good strategy?”) for low and high obsessive groups under suppression 
and control conditions in Study 1. Lower score indicates the belief that suppression is a 
counterproductive strategy.
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Figure 2. OBQ-87 Control of Thoughts subscale scores for low and high obsessive groups under 
suppression and control conditions in Study 1.
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